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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Case No: 20160235-SC

MICHAEL BINKS,
Defendant / Appellant.

REPLACEMENT REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

****
ARGUMENT
(i@

I. THE SEARCH WARRANT DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE POLICE TO STOP AND
SEARCH BINKS

Every argument in the first section of the State's brief depends upon one
premise, that this Court will conclude Binks was covered within the scope of the
warrant because he was at the location at a time that was "substantially
contemporaneous to the execution of the warrant". State's Replacement Brief at
19. Because the facts found by the trial court are clear and the State has no hope
in challenging those facts, the State needs this Court to conclude that the warrant
~

language "at the time of warrant service" and "during the time of warrant service"
can reasonably be interpreted to include the minutes preceding warrant service,
to expand the authorization of the warrant beyond its own language. Section A1
of the State's brief addresses this question directly and argues that the police can
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reasonably search and seize beyond the limits of the language because "people
like Binks" were who the warrant would have been directed towards. State's
Replacement Brief at 17. Then, section A2 presumes Binks was covered by the
warrant, and argues Bailey does not apply because it dealt with a case where the
defendant was not covered by the warrant. Section A3 again presumes it, and
argues the other cases cited in Binks' replacement brief are not persuasive
because those defendants were not specifically covered by the warrant. Each of
these arguments depends upon the legal conclusion that the warrant, interpreted
in a common sense way, authorized the police to detain and search Binks because
he was at the location before the warrant was executed.
Conversely, each of Binks' arguments depends upon the opposite point,
that this Court will find the warrant did not authorize the police to detain and
search Binks because he was not "at the location or attempting to leave the
location at the time of the warrant service". R.912, State's Exhibit 4. Binks' claims

~

depend upon this Court concluding it would not be reasonable for the police to
interpret the language of the warrant to authorize searches or seizures of people
or vehicles which were not at the location or attempting to leave the location "at
the time" or "during the time of warrant service." R.912, Exhibit 4. Regardless of
the fact that people like Binks were the kinds of people the police would want to
search and seize, the warrant did not mention Binks, and when it particularly
described the people who the police were allowed to search, people like Binks,
people not at the location or attempting to leave, were not among them.

2
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A. The officers' detention and search of Binks was not authorized by the
search warrant
The State's argument depends upon this Court creating a new exception to
the particularity requirement under the Fourth Amendment. According to the
State, even though warrants shall not issue unless they "particularly describ[e]
the place to be search, and the persons or things to be seized", if the persons or
(,j

places are not particularly described, but instead substantially described, then no
harm done. UNITED STATES CONST., AMEND. IV. What the State wants this Court to
do is conclude that when timing is part of the particulars explicitly describing
who can be searched in the warrant, that timing language need only be
"substantially" followed. The Court should not make this new exception.
1.

Binks and his SUV were not subject to search under the express
terms of the warrant

The State recognizes that officers executing a search warrant "must
~

interpret a warrant's terms reasonably", but argues that, because a reasonable
interpretation

1s

not

necessarily

the

"narrowest

possible

reasonable

interpretation", the police were reasonable in this case when they interpreted the
warrant more broadly than the language used in the warrant. State's
Replacement Brief at 18-19 (quoting United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940 (7th
Cir. 2010). According to the State, the police would have been reasonable to
interpret the language "any other person at the location or attempting to leave the
location at the time of warrant service" to also include 'any person who left the
location prior to the time of the warrant service.' Binks does not find this
3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

interpretation reasonable or common sense at all.
The State claims that requiring the police to read the language of the
warrant for what it actually says would be to require a hypertechnical reading of
the warrant, unnecessary under the Fourth Amendment. See State's Replacement
Brief at 18. According to the State, it would be unreasonable to expect the police
to understand the terms "at the time" and "during the time" to actually mean
something about the timing of the execution of the warrant. This is nonsense.
Any reasonable person would plainly understand these terms acted as a limit
upon who the warrant authorized for search, depending upon when the warrant
was executed. There is nothing confusing or hypertechnical about it.
It is helpful to discuss this idea of hypertechnical or overly narrow readings

in order to show that it would not apply in this case. For example, the State cites,
without analysis, to United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272 (9th Cir. 1996).
There, the defendant challenged the discovery of weapons, bullets, and explosives
found in a container outside his home (a bus) where the warrant only explicitly
authorized search of the bus/residence. The trial court granted a motion to
suppress finding the container was on the bus/residence's curtilage, and that "the
warrant on its face authorized a search of only the bus", not its curtilage.
Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 274. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court concluding
that to separate curtilage is "considered part of the home itself for Fourth
Amendment purposes" and therefore, a warrant that authorized search of the
home included authorization to search the curtilage. Gorman, 274 (citing Oliver

4
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(i;)

v. United State, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, So L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)). "The
(4@

search of the curtilage in this case was authorized because it was inseparable for
privacy purposes from the bus-residence identified in the warrant." Gorman, 275.
According to the Ninth Circuit, to conclude that the police should have made a
distinction between the bus/residence and the grounds immediately surrounding
it would have been hypertechnical and not required by the Fourth Amendment.
Unlike the warrant interpretation in Gorman, where the court found that
the same privacy interests related a home apply equally to the inside of the home
and its curtilage, there is no legal precedent to consider a person who was
recently in a home the same as a person is currently in a home, for privacy
reasons. According to the Supreme Court in Oliver, the legal justification for
overcoming a person's expectation of privacy in their home applies equally to the
area immediately surrounding the home. See Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (curtilage
"considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes."). No such
legal justification applies in this case. Courts have not found that a warrant
authorizing the search of a home and anyone in it also authorizes the search of

~

anyone who had been in the home in the past.
The State claims "the search warrant could reasonably be interpreted as

~

including people like Binks" but does not explain what is reasonable about the
change. What is reasonable about the police changing an explicit limitation in the
warrant? It is not like Gorman where the warrant's silence on curtilage is
reasonably inferred to mean the yard could be searched by authorization to

5
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search the home. The warrant's silence in this case on the issue of persons who
were not at the location when the warrant was served cannot be inferred from the
circumstances. There is nothing reasonable, there was no good reason, for the
police to conclude they could stop and search Binks based on a common sense
reading of the language of the warrant.
The State's argument requires the court to consider "the circumstances
and ... the nature of the property [or person] to be seized." Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207,
209. And the State's argument depends upon the Court finding that the
circumstances suggest that any discrepancies between the specific authorization
and what the police actually searched or seized is insignificant.
But the argument fails because this Court should not find these
discrepancies to be insignificant. And reference to relevant cases demonstrates
why. In Atkin the "police obtained a search warrant authorizing them to search
Atkin's residence" which was described by the street address, noting that the
"apartment of interest is in the basement" and describing the side door on the
main floor that led to the apartment. State v. Atkin, 2003 UT App 359, 18. On
appeal the defendant challenged the search of his computer because it not was
located in the basement portion of the home, but instead was found on the
upstairs landing portion of his apartment, and therefore was not within the scope
of the warrant. Atkin, 2003 UT App 359, ,I23.
The court of appeals found the that when the police decided to search the
landing portion of the apartment they were not involved in the "general,

6
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exploratory search against which the particularity requirement was designed to
(.j

protect." Atkin, ,I25. Instead, based on the evidence presented, although the
landing was not in the basement, "it is [] clear that the house was divided in such
a manner so as to render that landing part of the basement apartment." Atkin,
,I25. In other words, "given the nature of the division between the two

apartments," the warrant that explicitly authorized the search of the basement
apartment, implicitly authorized the search of the whole residence, including the
landing.
But there is good reason to distinguish between stretching the specific
language of the warrant in Atkin, and stretching the specific language in this case.
There is nothing about the language of the warrant in this case that implicitly
authorized the police to go after Binks when he left the location prior to the
execution of the warrant. Nothing about the nature of the place to be searched
would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that people who were not at the
apartment during the execution of the warrant could also be searched and seized.
There was nothing 'on the ground' that made the language of the warrant actually
mean something other than what it said. Unlike Atkin, the plain language
limitations of the warrant define the exact limits of the police authority.
In another relevant case, Gallegos, the defendant challenged the seizure of a
VCR and video cassette tapes taken from his home during the execution of an
otherwise unchallenged warrant. The warrant authorized the seizure of "all
controlled substances and stolen property", and on appeal the defendant claimed

7
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the language of the warrant was not specific enough for the Fourth Amendment's
particularity requirement, especially because the affidavit which described the
stolen property the police expected to find did not mention the VCR or tapes.
State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209-10 (Utah 1985). The State circularly argued

that because the warrant authorized seizure of "stolen property" and the VCR
turned out to be stolen, then the property was within the scope of the warrant.
Gallegos, 209-10.

This Court agreed with the defendant and noted that even where a warrant
is supported by a properly incorporated affidavit, "the seizure of the VCR and the
tapes was still not within the scope of the warrant; the affidavit lists only 'lawn
chairs, electrical wiring, children's swing, etc.' as being stolen property."
Oallegos, 210. Because the warrant itself described property only in generic

terms, it was "not favored by the law.'' Gallegos, 209. In other words, if it were
not for the affidavit that particularly described the stolen property the police had
probable cause to believe would be found, the warrant's use of the term 'stolen
property' would not have justified the seizure of any property.
This Court, in Gallegos, rejected the exact general argument the State wants
the Court to accept now. The State argues that because the and warrant generally
supports the idea that the owner of the house was suspected of dealing drugs, and
because Binks' interaction with the house was indicative of drug activity, the
explicit language of the warrant, which does not explicitly reach Binks, should be
ignored in favor of the general theme of the warrant because the police could

8
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~

reasonably interpret the search warrant's terms to include people like Binks who
(@

turned out to have drugs on him. In Gallegos the VCR was unknown to the police
or the issuing judge at the time the warrant was requested and approved, and not
particularly described therein, nor could the language of the warrant be
reasonably stretched to reach it. Similarly, Binks was not known to the police who
were investigating Perez, nor was he particularly described by the warrant. The

~

language of the warrant which explicitly did not reach him, cannot now be
stretched ex post facto to include him.
This Court should reject the State's flawed argument. The scope of the
warrant in Gallegos extended exactly to the reasonable limits of the language
used by the issuing magistrate incorporating the affidavit; to the property which
the police had reason to believe was stolen. So too here, the scope of the warrant
extends exactly to the reasonable limits of the language used by Judge Brady, the
police were authorized only to search "any other person at the location or
attempting to leave the location at the time of the warrant service" and "[a]ny
vehicle parked at the location or attempting to leave the location during the time

of service." Exhibit 4 (emphasis added). There was no reality on the scene, as
there was in Atkin, that makes the temporal limitation in the warrant flexible.
And just like Gallegos, when the police found additional property/persons they
wanted to search and seized, because they were not authorized beforehand the
cannot get authority from the warrant after-the-fact. Nothing about this case
<.1il>

should lead this Court to find that what the issuing magistrate intended to do was

9
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find probable cause to seize and search other persons who were at the location
prior to the time the warrant service.
It is important to remember that the trial court's factual findings are clear,
the "officers entered to execute the search warrant" "about a minute after the
defendant and the other man left the residence." R.501. 1 According the trial
court's findings, "at the time of warrant service" Binks was not "at the location or
attempting to leave the location". Exhibit 4. The court was equally clear when it
found "that the search of the residence began immediately after the car left."
R.438. According to the trial court's findings, which are not clearly erroneous,
"during the time of service" Binks' vehicle was not "parked at the location or
attempting to leave the location", the car had already left. Exhibit 4.
Binks pleads with the Court not to indulge any attempt by the State to divert
its attention from the basic uncontroverted facts. The trial court's findings, which
are not challenged by either party on appeal, are clear and ultimately
determinative to the legal issue. These facts must not be disturbed, avoided, or
ignored. The trial court found "that the search of the residence began
immediately after the car left." R-438 (emphasis added). 'After' is not reasonably
interpreted as equivalent to "at the time" or "during the time".
The State also wants to distinguish the very relevant holding in United

See Appellant's Replacement Brief at 15-18. Specifically note Adamson's
testimony: "From the time that you observed the vehicle leaving the parking lot in
the high density unit to the time that you served the warrant, how much time
elapsed?" R.092. Adamson replied: "It was maybe about a minute or two." R.092.
1

10
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States v. Brodie, 742 F.3d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 2014) by emphasizing that the court
@

there mentioned it was unclear how much longer the search team intended to
wait before they were actually going to execute the warrant. See State's Brief at
24-26. According to this logic, the problem for the government in Brodie was

only that the officers there were still waiting on several other members of the
search team when they stopped the defendant. The State wants this Court to be
tS

persuaded by the fact that the officers in this case only waited a minute or two
after Binks left the scene to execute the warrant, instead of some unknown time
like in Brodie, because "the Brodie court had no assurance that when the officers
stopped Brodie, the warrant would be executed any time soon." State's
Replacement Brief at 25 (emphasis added). In other words, according to the
State, it must have been the unknown additional delay that put the Brodie
challenge over the top.
The State's argument depends on the assumption that if the government in
Brodie had shown that those other officers showed up only a minute or two later

and then executed the warrant, then the seizure would have been constitutional,
(@

and the 'when' component would be satisfied. But this position completely
ignores the operative sentence in the paragraph. "The officers did not encounter
vii

Brodie 'when' a search was underway, even if we imagine a search to be in
progress from the minute officers start to advance from car or sidewalk to front
door." Brodie, 1062 (emphasis added). Even if searching had begun immediately
after the police seized the nearby defendant, that search would not have occurred

11
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"at the moment the police officers executed the search warrant." Brodie, 106
(citing Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 185 L.Ed.2d 19). 'At the

~

moment' means exactly what it says. The Court in Bailey, and the court in Brodie,
each understood that timing is crucial. In this case, according to the language of
the warrant, timing is everything.
As much as the State wants to avoid the timing issue, the plain language of
the warrant, which is the explicit limitation upon the police's authority, makes
when Binks was seized crucial. There is no doubt, Binks was not seized "at the
location or attempting to leave the location at the time of warrant service", nor
was his "vehicle parked at the location or attempting to leave the location during
the time of service." State's Exhibit 4 (emphasis added). Given these
unchallenged facts, the State has not provided any convincing reason for this
Court to stretch the specific timing language of the warrant to consume Binks or
his vehicle. The State's assurance that such a stretch will not have a deleterious
effect upon the particularity requirement of the constitution is unpersuasive and
defies the straightforward language of Bailey and Brodie.
The State is wrong, the warrant cannot be reasonably be read to include
authorization to seize and then search someone who was not at the location at the
time the warrant was served. As Judge Laycock explicitly found, Binks was not at
the location at the time the warrant was served.
B.

Bailey applies to this case, and according to the factors Binks was not
in the immediate vicinity

The State makes a new argument to this Court, one that was not made to
12
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~

the trial court, nor to the Court of Appeals in its initial briefing. Now that the case
~

has been certified for transfer to this Court, the State claims that the warrant is
distinct from the warrant at issue in Bailey, and other immediate vicinity cases,
because those warrants did not specifically apply to the persons who were seized

~

and searched after they left. According to the State, the warrant in this case
substantially applied to Binks because this warrant covered all persons present
(;j

and he was at the scene just before the warrant was executed. See State's
Replacement Brief at

20-30.

Binks claims this new distinction is not worth

investigating because he maintains, as argued above, he was not covered by the
warrant in this case. So even if the new argument the State has now raised is
correct, and none of the defendants in these immediate vicinity cases were
covered by a search warrant, Binks is just like the people being seized and
searched in these other cases because he, just like they, was not covered by the
warrant when he was seized and searched.
But even if this argument has enough merit to be considered, it fails when
compared to the facts of Bailey. The State claims the defendant in Bailey was
"not subject to a search warrant" in the same way that Binks was, and therefore
Bailey is inapplic~ble. See State's Replacement Brief at

22-23.

Binks replies that

this asserted distinction is not supported by the facts of the cases. Although the
Supreme Court did not focus on the language of the warrant in Bailey, because
that was not the issue raised, now that the State has raised this distinction, the
~

language of the warrant in Bailey is relevant and should be examined.

13
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The language of the warrant in Bailey is more completely discussed in the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision at United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197
(2011). There the court described the warrant as particularly authorizing the
search of a basement apartment at a specific address "'believed to be occupied by
an individual known as 'Polo', a heavy set black male with short hair' and
identified a 'chrome .380 handgun' as the principal target of the search." Bailey,
652 F.3d 197, 200 (emphasis added). During surveillance, prior to execution of
the warrant, the police observed the defendant and another man, both of whom
matched Polo's description, exit the premises. When the defendant was stopped
"he identified himself and said he was coming from his home at" the address
listed in the search warrant. See Bailey, 133 S.Ct. 1031, 1036. Why the State
would assert that the defendant in Bailey was not the subject of the warrant,
when he was specifically described therein, and Binks was the subject of the
warrant, when he was not described at all, is confusing.

~

Another relevant point omitted in the State's brief is the fact that the trial
court's decision was based upon Bailey. The State criticizes Binks for referring to
Bailey but ignores the history of this case. It is as if, according to the State, even

though the trial court's "Findings of Law" were explicitly "[g]uided by Bailey",
and the court concluded that Binks' "vehicle and its occupants were therefore
within the 'spatial constraint' authorized by the Supreme Court in Bailey", Binks
should not now analyze Bailey in his appeal from the trial court's decision.
R.503-04. This criticism is strange. It is even more strange when the Court of

14
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(f;

Appeals' certification order is reviewed. There the Court of Appeals determined
@

that this Court should settle the "important question of law... related to the
application of Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031 (2013), including the scope
of police officers' authority under an 'all persons and vehicles present' residential
search warrant to detain and search individuals who have driven from the
premises just before service of the warrant." Clearly, application of the Bailey

~

analysis to these facts is central to the question presented in this appeal.
Because Binks was not at the location at the time of the warrant service or
attempting to leave during the time of the service, the Bailey immediate vicinity
test is the only means by which the police could have tried to justify detention of
Binks away from the house. However, as explained in Binks' replacement brief,
the Bailey factors all suggest the police were not permitted to seize or search
Binks based on his relationship to the location of the search. See Appellant's
Replacement Brief at 24-27 (Binks was not seized within the legal limits of the
property, Binks was not stopped within the line of sight of the premises, and
Binks' location did not support an easy reentry to the premises). These factors

(@

undoubtedly support Binks' claim that he was not within the immediate vicinity,
thus it is not surprising that the State has now changed its tactics before this
~

Court. Fortunately for Binks, that new tactic depends upon this Court reading
some very strange inferences, inferences not associated with common sense, into
the language of the warrant.

15
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IL

THE POLICE ILLEGALLY EXTENDED THE SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP

Because Binks' detention and search were not authorized by the search
warrant the question becomes whether there are other justifications to detain and
ultimately search Binks. The State's argument on this point does not require
much response. The State acknowledges that Sgt. Jones finished investigating the
possibility that Binks was under the influence of drugs by 8:19 p.m. and that
Binks was then searched at 8:25 p.m. State's Brief at 32. The question is what
justified the continued detention, and the State can only point to the "totality of
the circumstances." Binks maintains that this is an insufficient response.
As explained in his replacement brief, Binks maintains that a review of the
evidence, including the call logs, the officers' testimony, and the dash cam video,
shows that the officers were delaying the traffic stop in order to hear back from
the other officers executing the search warrant. This delay, this extension, was
unreasonable.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

Because the language of the warrant did authorize the police to search
Binks, and because Binks was not within the immediate vicinity of the search, the
police were not authorized by the existence of the warrant to detain or search
him. Because the police extended the scope of the traffic stop the evidence
collected from that search should have been suppressed. Binks asks the Court to
reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, reverse his conviction,
and remand the case for a new trial.
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